Ghana's 2008 elections -a showcase for Africa?
1 Successive democratic elections in Ghana in 1996 Ghana in , 2000 Ghana in , 2004 Ghana in , and 2008 There exists a longstanding controversy about 'ethnic block voting' and how important swing voting has been in Ghana 's Fourth Republic (1992 . Although the size of the core voting population in Ghana had been considerable, at least in the 1996 and in the 2000 elections (about 82% of the voting population) which brought about the first democratic alternation of power, it was not overwhelming -thus refuting assumptions that voting volatility in transitional regimes is higher than in consolidated democracies (cf. 1 Thanks for valuable comments go to Steve Tonah and Sebastian Elischer. The responsibility for any fallacies or inaccuracies in the paper remains of course with the authors. The latter participated in the 2008 elections as international election observers with the EU Election Observation Mission and the Carter Centre respectively. The views are those of the authors alone. 2 As expected, the contesting major parties and their candidates attainted their best results with highest voter turnout in their respective strongholds: Nana Akufo-Addo, leader of the National Patriotic Party (NPP) gained 75 percent in Ashanti, and Atta Mills, presidential candidate of National Democratic Congress (NDC) got 86 percent in Volta region, also labelled as the 'World Bank' of the NDC by party veteran and former head of state Jerry Rawlings (cf. graph 1).
Lindberg /Morrison 2005:565) . Apart from ethnicity, 4 core and swing voters cannot be distinguished by structural factors, like level of education, the rural-urban divide, income, and occupation. In the meantime the percentage of swing voters might have increased.
Nevertheless, strong 'ethnic block voting' in two regions has persisted: Ashanti and Volta regions (cf. Morrison/Hong 2006:235, 239; Fridy 2007: 282, 286-89) The history of Ghana's electoral processes shows that, at least in popular perception, ethnicity matters more than any other socioeconomic variable (cf. Fridy 2007:281, 302; Tonah 2009 success story? Whatever the truth of the matter, the outcome is fraught with perils for the future. Because both the NDC and the NPP believe that the other side perpetrated fraud in their strongholds and got away with it, it is highly likely that they will try to do so on an even greater scale in 2012. This raises the prospects of electoral violence and the delegitimation of the electoral process unless the matter is squarely dealt with.
Diplomatic & technocratic bias in election observation in Ghana's 2008 elections?
The peaceful and largely transparent outcome of the 2008 elections was to a large extent due to the strong commitment and active engagement of Ghana's media and civil society, In fact, a total of nine constituencies in Ashanti, two to four in Volta, and one in Central, Those who commented favourably on the elections pointed out that the Election Commissioner, Dr. Afari-Gyan, performed a tremendous achievement in producing a legitimate result. However, at the height of the disputed runoff, his strategy appears to have been to call the bluff of the NPP by accepting the questionable results from Ashanti and then pointing out that these were not enough to overturn the majority that had been chalked up by Mills. When the NPP insisted that the Tain constituency, where there had been no voting, could still affect the outcome, he called their bluff again and agreed not to declare the result until the election had been re-run there. No doubt, this was evidence of skilful footwork, but the point remains that the final result was arrived by glossing over allegations of significant electoral fraud. The precedent that has been set is a dangerous one and there is no guarantee that a future Commissioner will be as fleet of foot.
The case of Ashanti Region
17 As questionable are considered turnout figures in constituencies which apply to one of the following three cases: (1) turnout of over 95%, or (2) turnout over 90% along with overwhelmingly (> 80%) votes for one candidate, or (3) differences in votes cast between 1 st and 2 nd round of more than 10% with high overall turnout (>80%) in the 2 nd round. The latter is considered to be doubtful as well because it is unlikely that even the newly employed tactic of the NPP in its stronghold, i.e. vigorous house-to-house campaigns dubbed "fre wo nua" (literally, call your brother to go and vote) could result in such a massive increase in the total number of additional voters within the short two week long election campaign between the 1 st and 2 nd round. A real concern for the NPP campaign team was that Ashanti voters might not turn out to vote for an Akyem Presidential candidate, even if they remained broadly disposed to the NPP as a party. Hence turnout was always regarded as a prime consideration. Nana AkufoAddo brought prominent Ashantis into his campaign in order to reassure voters that the party remained firmly rooted in its tradition as an Ashanti/Akyem alliance. The team staged big rallies in Kumasi and larger urban centres in an attempt to persuade voters that it retained enthusiastic support in the Region. The fundamental question of how many Ashanti voters there actually were was dogged by controversy from the start. Before the reopening of the voters' register, the NDC complained that the figures for 13 Ashanti constituencies were massively inflated. In April, the EC set up an independent committee to investigate this claim. Dr. Afari-Gyan, initially lent credence to NDC fears when he confirmed that the increase in the number of voters in Ashanti was not credible, but in June he revised his assessment. He announced that the incorrect figures, which were the result of a printing error, only existed in hard copies of the register that had been sent to parties and that they were not replicated in the EC's own database. Although this supposedly meant that there should be no further cause for concern, the NDC believed that any error was deliberate and would be brought into play later on. The problem was compounded when the register was reopened to allow those who had attained full voting age to add their names. The NDC alleged that there had been systematic attempts to pump up the numbers in Ashanti, through a combination of double-and under-age registration. Therefore, the opposition parties remained extremely sceptical about the figures in Ashanti. During the campaign, Rawlings not surprisingly returned to the claim that there was a plot to rig the election, centred on Ashanti. The fact that some large question marks remained over the process disposed many opposition supporters to believe the worst.
The election campaign in the region witnessed a few incidents of violence, but some of these involved rival candidates for NPP Parliamentary nominations -as was the case in Table 1 ). In other words, regional turnout had dipped slightly, but this was to the disadvantage of Akufo-Addo. Mills had seen his total number votes and his share of the Ashanti vote increase. The NDC had also managed to increase its number of parliamentary seats to three -New Edubiase. Ejura Sekyedumase and Asawase -while two NPP rebel candidates had won as independent candidates. All of this was understandably a matter of considerable alarm to the NPP campaign team.
Akufo-Addo supporters privately complained that the relatively low turnout in Ashanti had cost Akufo-Addo a first round victory which he only narrowly missed (with 49.1 percent of the national vote). There was also some dissatisfaction at the failure of Kufuor to play a more active role on the campaign trail, which may have been rooted in his historically strained relationship with elements of the Ashanti political elite (Elischer 2008 ) and his earlier support for Alan Kyerematen as the party candidate. In the campaigning for the second round, Kyerematen, who had briefly resigned from the party, was brought in to head the campaign in Ashanti in the belief that he held the key to a higher turnout -despite being a Fante. A special appeal was made to Ashanti voters to prevent Rawlings from staging a comeback on the coat-tails of Mills. The Mills campaign meanwhile hoped to make modest gains in Ashanti, while consolidating the swing elsewhere. This is confirmed by evidence in other countries, where elections have taken a violent turn in the post-poll period. The claim that two different sets of results were received in the EC 'strong room', with the second revealing much higher figures than the first, has never been properly explained. What is even more suspicious is that the regional office of the EC appears to have deliberately held back declaring a number of Ashanti results.
19 By releasing the NPP' bombs at the end, the NDC claimed, it was possible to claim victory at the last gasp, once it was known how many votes were still required to concoct a victory.
There is some plausibility to this reading of what happened because a relatively comfortable Mills majority suddenly evaporated as the last results came in. It was not enough, as it happened, but the NPP came close to snatching victory at the last gasp:
Constituencies that declared late included the same ones where there was an implausible turnout: notably Nhyiaeso (98.3 percent), Kwadaso (94.5 percent), Manhyia (95.7 percent), and Suame (94.7 percent).
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The NDC complained about these figures, but after the Tain result was declared AfariGyan announced on 3 January 2009 that the EC had investigated the complaints and concluded that the NDC had failed to produce sufficient evidence in the shape of complete polling station returns for the disputed constituencies. In reality, this was a mammoth task, especially when some polling agents had not been present at the final count. Although the NDC was still deeply unhappy, it had been declared the overall winner and decided to live with the Ashanti anomalies rather than provoke a crisis. Since then, the EC has shown no inclination to revisit the issue. It has offered no explanation of the turnout figures, no reason for the late declaration of certain Ashanti results and has failed to mount a complete set of results on its website that would enable Ghanaians to judge for themselves. These are serious shortcomings that might come back to haunt the country in the future.
The case of Volta Region
The doctor by profession and very popular amongst the Dagomba, the biggest group in the constituency. The NPP strategy was accordingly focussed on minority areas where they aspired to win at least four constituencies: Nkwanta North again, Nkwanta South, Krachi East, Krachi West as well as Ketu North in the Southern part of the Region where the Regional Minister was running. The NPP officials boasted of their concern for the welfare of the whole region: for example, they pointed out that their government had built a Polytechnic College in Ho which could significantly redress the perception of marginalization. Nevertheless, there was a common belief amongst people that public money had been diverted by a corrupt national government to other regions that were better endowed with basic infrastructure like roads, schools and hospitals.
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The NPP exploited the advantage of the incumbency in Volta region. For example they were able to provide large numbers of T-Shirts, school books in the villages, traditional presents to the Chiefs and Queenmothers, and -at least according to usually well informed local informants -also cash as an incentive to vote for the 'right' candidate.
Some money was allegedly used to bring registration officers 'on board'. 22 The deal was said to involve the registration of anyone brought by the party with no questions asked, including 'minors', and to place potential opposition voters on a wrong list of voters. This was precisely what happened in Hohoe during the registration process where two employees of the Regional Electoral Commission (REC) were arrested by police because of manipulating voters' lists. 23 According to information released by the police, the accused confessed having taken money from NPP. However, no complaint about the registration process was brought to the knowledge of the EU observers. Other fraudulent practices concerned ballot papers meant for NDC strongholds, that would be rendered useless by printing mistakes and subsequently be rejected by NPP party agents. This happened in a few places (e.g. in Nkwanta District), but its net effect was only to delay the voting process, and not to hinder it. In addition the NPP organized so called 'Party Youth' in a number of constituencies like Krachi East, with the aim of harassing opposition and election officials. This happened in Dambai. 21 In an Afrobarometer questionaire 'How Ghanaians Rate the Performance of the NPP Administration' (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 49 from June 2008) especially the Presidency is linked to corruption and government to inflation and income gaps. Though the data are taken nationwide they probably apply to the Volta Region as well. 22 This allegation is based on a strategy paper by NPP giving hints how to manipulate elections. Only some are being referred to here which actually took place. 23 A court case was fixed after the election.
In the Regional NDC office the mood was the opposite. The atmosphere was very tense and party officials repeatedly came out with new press releases about planned fraud of their competitors -sometimes based on very questionable claims. They insisted that, for example in Dambai, houses of NDC members had been marked by NPP youths, thereby echoing what had happened in Rwanda. Yet no hard evidence could be shown to the observers.
The REC (Regional Electoral Commission) was able to secure an acceptable election process. Apart from Buem Constituency (District Jasikan), all constituency result sheets had been signed by representatives from both parties. In Jasikan, NPP agents failed to turn up for the tabulation process. The Returning Officer claimed that NPP party officials told them to stay away. The results in Volta Region showed a NDC landslide.
Apart from Nkwanta North, 24 all other constituencies went to the NDC in the parliamentary polls. Many people spoken to by the EU observers had anticipated a result like this. In all districts or constituencies targeted by NPP, the party did better than ever before, and yet it was still far away from achieving a majority. There were only minor incidents, like in Krachi East where the car taking the ballot boxes to the regional office was attacked on the way and the boxes stolen. Since the Presiding Officer carried the signed result sheets, the REC was able to announce the results.
An internal strategy paper of the NPP, 25 which analyzed the first-round defeat in the region and recommended new tactics for the presidential run-off, raised some points that should be outlined here. It claimed that the NPP in the districts had not been able to give sufficient 'cash incentive' to REC officers, Police and Opinion Leaders. Party agents were paid inadequately and were more prepared to accept money from other sources. Many polling agents were identified as active NDC members. 26 This led to speculation about where the money from the Party's Headquarter had gone. The consequence for the regional NPP was that the Party's 'National Campaign Coordination' took over the party structure in the Volta Region. But it leaves no doubt that money was part of the party's strategy in Volta Region. 24 The NPP did not win with a big margin which was due to a number of independent candidates who could win a substantial number of votes. At the presidential election NDC secured the majority. 25 A copy of this paper was placed in the hands of the EU observers. 26 This argument was never brought to the knowledge of the EU observers. On the other hand CODEO should have known since their observers came from the area but did not mention it maybe because they were not represented well in the Region.
Not much was seen in the local arena regarding the upcoming run-off, by contrast with the heated discussions on TV, radio and in the newspapers about electoral rigging in Volta and Ashanti Regions. NPP officials claimed that the elections in the Volta Region had been marred by fraud and stressed that their party agents had been harassed and had not been allowed to take up their duties. Apparently these general accusations were unfounded since their agents had signed all result sheets except one at the tabulation centres. It would have been easy for the REC in Ho to clarify all accusations, but the EC answered solely in general terms and did not refer to any concrete allegation. 27 In the end, it was part of NPP's propaganda to discredit the NDC in the run-off. Conduct of the political parties as well as the formal legal precautions against instrumentalization of ethnicity in politics in the next elections remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Certainly Ghana's process of democratization is more advanced than in many other countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Already in the past, swing voting was in general significant enough to produce changes of government. In addition, it has become more difficult for individuals and political parties to cheat in Ghana's elections despite persistent voting irregularities and widespread abuse of incumbency. Two factors are important in this respect: first, the EC has largely been seen as an independent, fair and credible institution. Second, the elite and large sections of the population were prepared to accept results declared by the EC. Nevertheless, neglected or unrecognized electoral fraud and a history of impunity -underwritten by 'ethnicity' 39 in already volatile constituencies and 38 All chiefs, queenmothers, herbalists, and church authorities spoken to were convinced about a clear win for NDC in Volta Region. Though they officially have a neutral position in reality they play an active role, using informal structures usually closed for outsiders. 39 Again we underline that the category 'ethnicity' is problematic in so far as ethnic categories in Ghana are not that fixed. The Akan category for example is deeply problematic (cf. Nugent 2001). Nevertheless, 'ethnic regions of decisive importance for the general outcome of the polls -could encourage large scale electoral fraud in future elections. This poses a threat and destabilizing factor in Ghana's democratization process.
The Achilles' heel of election administration in Ghana was the dubious voters'
register and the irresolute attitude of the EC and other responsible authorities when it came to the rechecking of improbably high voter turnouts and apparent 'ethnic block voting' in several constituencies. Surprisingly, neither of the big political parties seem to have bothered to insist on rigorous in-depth investigation once their complaints were rebuffed by the EC. Could it be that the instrumentalization of ethnicity for voting was a zero-sum game, and that all concerned hoped to profit from it eventually? Or is ethnicity in Ghana still such a deadly issue that no-one dares touch it, lest it explode in his face?
Apparently, the constitutional and other legal provisions mentioned above to 
